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Abstract 
The aim of this research is to investigate the relationship between Internal corporate governance mechanisms and 
on the unsystematic risks using data from 13 commercial banks listed on the Amman Stock Exchange during the 
period 2009-2016. Panel data was utilized and the data gathered from 104 annual reports from13 commercial banks 
in Amman, which analyzed using descriptive statistics, correlation, and regression. Seven main corporate 
governance variables were analyzed in terms namely: (Board size, Board Independence, CEO /Chairman 
Separation, Audit Committee Independence, Ownership concentration, Institutional Ownership, and Foreign 
Ownership) their relative of the unsystematic risk (credit risk, liquidity risk, and operational risk). furthermore, 
bank size and debt Ratio were used as a control variable. Based on the results of the study, it has been observed 
that Internal corporate governance mechanisms variables have a significant effect on the unsystematic risk. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
Last decade, some successful banks collapsed suddenly after a good performance. For example, in the UK, 
Northern Rock was one of the FATS 100s, but in February 2008 it was nationalized by the government. In the US, 
this problem has increasingly sparked the fare of investors affecting the bank industry in particular and market 
indices, not only in the UK but also in the world(Sants, 2008) states that “the FSA acknowledges that its 
supervision of Northern Rock in the period leading up to July 2007 was not of sufficient intensity or appropriate 
rigour to challenge the company's board and executive on their risk management practices and their understanding 
of the risks posed by their business model”. 
Corporate Governance has received considerable attention, especially following the massive costly corporate 
scandals that have focused on the possibility that many problems with the reason to structural factors. In particular, 
collapses such as those that occurred at Maxwell Communications Corporation (MCC), Enron, Parmalat and others, 
suggested that the failure, or inability, of boards of directors to control and monitor business, laxity in accounting 
standards and an ethos of contented indifference on the part of many business leaders, had played important roles. 
In response, many committees have been formed (e.g., Cadbury Report 1992, Smith report 2003, Higgs Report 
2003) conclude many recommendations to reform the corporate governance status. Among the significant 
recommendations are the board of directors responsible for the risk that faces the company in the business 
environment for international environments(Aksoy & Dayi, 2017).  
The Financial Times (2008) reported that one of the main reasons for the world's largest investment bank, 
such as Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley and Citigroup, was risk management deficiencies. The author of the 
report Hal Weitzman calls for a review of risk management strategies and system procedures. Skypala (2008) of 
the Financial Times is blaming executives for not using risk management when using funds.(T Ulusoy, 
2008a)states that government bonds also useful for anti-collapse role of business. Another reason for the collapse 
of Enron is the conflict between managers and shareholders, which causes the manager acted for their own interests 
and although that was against the targets of shareholders. Maybe, they can fail financial failure(Civan & Dayı, 
2014). 
According to the Basel Committee on Bank Supervision, effective corporate governance practices are 
essential to achieving and maintaining public trust and confidence in the banking system, which is critical for 
proper functioning of the banking sector and the economy as a whole((BIS), 2014). Because the banking system 
plays a very important role in the economy, corporate governance is important and risk management is essential 
in financial institutions(Trinh, Duyen, & Thao, 2015).  
Therefore, researches on corporate governance and risk management have been interested in the recent 
academic literature(McNulty, Florackis, & Ormrod, 2012; Salhi & Boujelbene, 2012; Tsorhe, Aboagye, & 
Kyereboah-Coleman, 2011; Zhong, Gribbin, & Zheng, 2007) emphasized the impact of board strengths and 
stakeholder behaviours on the management of bank capital risk, credit risk, and liquidity risk. Some other 
researches about systematic risk(T Ulusoy, 2008b).  
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Jordan is a small country with limited resources; its financial market is aiming to the principles of equality, 
transparency and effectiveness. However, Jordan like other countries also experienced financial collapses such as 
Shamaylaeh Gate, which forces regulatory bodies to adopt a sequence of legislative, economic and financial 
reforms that intended to promote transparency, accountability and the rule of law in the economic life of the 
country(JFED, 2003). In 2005, the Jordan Securities Commission (JSC)’s announced the first Jordanian corporate 
governance codes for corporations listed in the ASE for the purpose of establishing a solid framework that regulates 
their relations and defines their responsibilities to safeguard shareholders. 
The aspects of corporate governance in banking business, such as the characteristics of the board of directors, 
salaries and executive heads, have been addressed in a few recent academic studies (eg, Beltratti and Stulz, 
forthcoming; Erkens et al., 2010; Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011). However, corporate governance literature and the 
impact of corporate governance in financial firms are still very limited especially the case of a developing country 
such as that of Jordanian. Financ0ial institutions have their own characteristics, such as high transparency, tight 
regulation, and intervention by a government. During establishing characterization of firms; governments also 
point out the financial power of own country(Tolga Ulusoy, 2011). 
This work investigates on the assessment of the link existing between Internal corporate governance 
mechanisms on the unsystematic risks. Moreover, we have used in this model to comprises two control variables 
related to variables characteristics; namely the bank size, and debt Ratio that it shows the effect of independent 
variables with dependent variables, as well as reduce random errors in the model through previous studies. Also, 
we suggest that the findings of this study could prove significant to regulators, investors, academics and others 
who argued that good corporate governance is important for raising investor assurance and market liquidity 
(Donaldson, 2003). With the compliance focusing on corporate governance presented by the Jordanian authorities, 
such as the report of finance committee on corporate governance, the Jordanian code of corporate governance and 
Jordanian stock exchange listing requirements. So, this paper will approach the impact of Internal corporate 
governance mechanisms on the unsystematic risks at Jordanian commercial banks listed on the Amman stock 
exchange. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2: Hypotheses and conceptual framework. Section 3: we show 
empirical analysis. The final section provides a summary and conclusion. 
 
2. HYPOTHESES AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1. Cconceptual Framework 
Figure (1) is shown to suggested for study mode conceptual frameworks are formed as below: 
 
The researcher relied on the answer to the problem and objectives of the paper with the following main 
hypothesis: 
H1: There is an effect with a clear statistic significant between the impact of Internal corporate governance 
mechanisms and the unsystematic risk in Jordanian Commercial Banks listed on the Amman Stock Exchange.  
The main hypothesis divided three hypotheses 
H1. There is an effect with a clear statistic significant between the impact of Internal Corporate Governance 
Mechanisms  and Credit Risk. 
H2. There is an effect with a clear statistic significant between the impact of Internal Corporate Governance 
Mechanisms and liquidity risk . 
H3. There is an effect with a clear statistic significant between the impact of Internal Corporate Governance 
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Mechanisms and operational risk. 
 
2.2. Study variables  
This section will be displayed the Seven independent variables include (Board size, Board Independence, CEO 
/Chairman Separation, Audit Committee Independence, Ownership concentration, Institutional Ownership, and 
Foreign Ownership) and the dependent variables (credit risk, liquidity risk, and operational risk). In addition, 
two control variables; namely the bank size and debt Ratio. The empirical model is as follow: 
2.2.1. Internal Corporate Governance Mechanisms Variables 
2.2.1.1. The Board Size (BS) 
The board of directors consider an important part of the governance structure of companies, The board of directors 
considers an important part of the governance structure of companies where, that the small size of the board to be 
more balanced and leads to increases their efficiency, coordination, and accuracy in decision-making and improve 
company performance(Alhumoudi, 2016; Christensen, Kent, & Stewart, 2010; Marn & Romuald, 2012). 
2.2.1.2. The Board Independence (BI) 
Institutional investors play an active role in the governance of banks. Indeed, Jensen noted that the presence of 
institutional directors on the boards of directors allows better control of the executive, as these Directors have 
better access to information and greater expertise in the management of bank risks(Jensen, 1993). 
2.2.1.3. CEO /Chairman Separation (DUAL) 
The literature on duality or plurality of positions of the CEO and chairman of the board of directors has separate 
opinions. Some authors argue for accumulated reasons of efficiency management unit (Fogelberg & Griffith, 
2000)and others denounced for abuse of power by the executive(Fama & Jensen, 1983; Pathan, 2009; Pi & Timme, 
1993). When the CEO is the same person who holds the position of the Board Chairman, the capacity to influence 
decisions within the board will increase. 
2.2.1.4. Audit Committee Independence (ACI) 
The role of the board involves the formulation and supervision of strategic objectives. For efficiency reasons, 
certain tasks are assigned to smaller groups; that is, committees, based on the members' expertise and 
interests(Christensen et al., 2010). 
2.2.1.5. Ownership concentration (OC) 
 In terms of block ownership, it has been argued that the greater the number of benefits (usually measured in 5%), 
will show concern for business performance, which is more important than that of shareholders(Marn & Romuald, 
2012). 
2.2.1.6. Institutional Ownership (IO) 
Institutional shareholders, who have a large number of shares, play a very important role in overseeing the 
company and their ability to supervise managers(Marn & Romuald, 2012). 
2.2.1.7. Foreign Ownership (FO) 
The privatization and the entry of foreign banks and private banks newly existing increased their risk of the asset 
portfolio where the presence of foreigners in the ownership structure is negatively related to bank 
efficiency(Lensink & Morrissey, 2006; Shrieves & Dahl, 1992). 
2.2.2. The Unsystematic Risks Variables 
2.2.2.1. Credit Risk (CR) 
Credit risk considered as one of the main risks because it is connected with all activities where Its objective to 
maintain the efficiency of the business activities and the continuity of the business (Spuchľáková, Valašková, & 
Adamko, 2015). 
2.2.2.2. Liquidity Risk (LR) 
Liquidity risk refers to the probability relating institutions ability to provide enough funds to meet their obligations 
when they. SO, the banks’ risk-taking behavior and bank performance have impacted by the regulatory 
environment(Ly, 2015; Woods & Dowd, 2008). 
2.2.2.3. Operational Risk (OR) 
The committee adopted a unified industry definition for operational risks, namely: "The risk of direct or indirect 
loss resulting from the insufficiency or failure of internal processes, personnel, systems, or external events 
(SUPERVISION, 2010). 
2.2.3. The control variables 
It was added in order to control the relationship between independent variables and dependent variables, view the 
effect of independent variables with dependent variables, as well as reduce random errors in the model through 
previous studies (Liao, Mukherjee, & Wang, 2015; Obradovich & Gill, 2013; Tahir, Rehman, & Rehman.Naveed, 
2015; Yaseen & Al-Amarneh, 2015), and the most important of these variables bank size and debt ratio. 
 
2.3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
This study is considered of the applied studies, which is based on private data of Jordanian banks, the study adopted 
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the descriptive analytical approach in attempting to make meaningful inferences relating to the relationship of 
corporate governance variables and the unsystematic risk of the chosen sample. 
2.3.1. Society and the research sample 
The study population consisted of all Jordanian commercial banks listed on the Amman Stock Exchange, and their 
number (13) banks, the study relied of series of the annual of corporate governance reports and financial statements 
of the commercial banks during the period (2009 -2016), where they were collected 104 annual reports from13 
commercial banks in Amman.  
2.3.2. Data analysis 
The data for the study variables will be collected from the annual reports of the study banks for the period of study 
2009-2016 and Statistical analysis will be employed in this study in order to examine the relationship among 
variable, to test the hypotheses and validate the findings. The data collected will be analysed using the E-views 6 
to perform the correlation test, the regression test, and the descriptive statistical analysis. 
Model Specification 
2.3.3. The Measure of the unsystematic risk 
This section aims to present the empirical model of the study. The dependent variable is the unsystematic risk 
(credit risk, liquidity risk, and operational risk). The Seven independent variables include: -: Board size, Board 
Independence, CEO /Chairman Separation, Audit Committee Independence, Ownership concentration, 
Institutional Ownership, and Foreign Ownership. Finally, this model also comprises two control variables related 
to variables characteristics; namely the bank size and debt Ratio. The empirical model is as follow:  
The first model 
CREDR=β0+β1(BS)+β2(BI)+β3(DUAL)+β4(ACI)+β5(OC)+β6(IO)+β7(FO)+β8 (SIZE)+ β9+ (DR)+εt 
The second model 
LIQR=β0+β1(BS)+β2(BI)+β3(DUAL)+β4(ACI)+β5(OC)+β6(IO)+β7(FO)+β8 (SIZE)+ β9+ (DR)+εt 
The third model 
OPR=β0+β1(BS)+β2(BI)+β3(DUAL)+β4(ACI)+β5(OC)+β6(IO)+β7(FO)+β8 (SIZE)+ β9+ (DR)+ε 
Table 1:  Measure study variables 
Dependent Variable: Risk Management  
Variable 
 
Indicator(s) Measurement(s) 
 
 
Banking Risks 
 
Credit Risk  Non-Performing Loans Ratio (NPLR) to Total 
gross loan 
Liquidity Risk  Liquidly Ratio (LR)  
Cash Assets to Total Assets  
Capital Adequacy Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR)  
Operation Risk  Basic Indicator Approach: 
Capital required to meet operational risks 
Independent Variable: Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Corporate 
Governance 
Mechanisms  
Board Size (BS)  The number of members on a board in a year 
Board Independence (BI)  The ratio of non-executive directors to total 
board directors 
CEO /Chairman Separation Dummy variable 1 if there’s a Separation; 0 if 
not 
Independence of the Audit 
Committee (IAC) 
The proportion of an independent non-executive 
of number Committee to the total number of 
Audit Committee Audit Committee size 
Ownership concentration (OC) 
(Large Shareholders) 
Ratio of Shareholders Ownership have 5% or 
more from bank shares 
Companies Ownership (CO) The proportion of bank shares owned by 
companies 
Foreign Ownership (FO) The proportion of ownership of foreign 
investors who own shares in the bank 
Control Variable 
Bank size (BS) Size of the Bank measured by total 
assets. 
Log of total assets. 
Debt ratio Represents the relationship 
between a bank’s long-term debt 
and its book value of equity. 
Ratio of long-term debt to book value of equity 
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3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
3.1. Descriptive statistical analysis 
The summary of the descriptive statistics for the panel data in all Jordanian commercial banks listed on the Amman 
Stock Exchange is reported in Table 2. It shows the distribution of the unsystematic risk measurement (credit risk, 
liquidity risk, and operational risk) and Internal corporate governance mechanisms variables (Board size, Board 
Independence, CEO /Chairman Separation, Audit Committee Independence, Ownership concentration, 
Institutional Ownership, and Foreign Ownership). furthermore, control variables (bank size and debt Ratio).  
Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
Variables Mean Max Min Stdev 
CR 9.16 22.40 1.84 4.11 
LR 12.07 27.79 4.07 4.91 
0R 17.38 19.86 15.57 1.01 
BS 10.7 14.0 6.0 1.8 
BI 37.2 77.8 0.0 15.8 
DUAL 10 9.62 94 90.4 
ACI 59.5 75.0 20.0 15.5 
OC 59.7 88.5 21.3 20.1 
IO 8.37 91.86 0.00 13.26 
FO 35.2 89.1 0.0 29.7 
SIZE 21.4 24.0 19.5 1.0 
DR 85.7 93.5 78.0 2.6 
The table above shows the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the study. The mean of credit risks 
for all banks for the period 2009 – 2016, was (9.16%), with standard deviation (4.11%). While, The mean value 
(12.07%) liquidity risks, with standard deviation (4.91%) for all banks for the period 2009 – 2016. Also, the mean 
of operating risks for all banks for the period 2009 – 2016, was (17.38%), with standard deviation (1.01%). 
The board size was (10.7), with standard deviation (1.8) for all banks for the period 2009 – 2016. Regarding 
board independence, the sample means the value of (37.2%) shows that the ratio of independent non-executive 
directors (INEDAC) is slightly close to the half of the total number of the directors, with standard deviation (15.8%)  
for all banks for the period 2009 – 2016, With regards to shows that the duality for all banks for the period 2009 – 
2016, where the number of observations of duality was (10), which formed (9.62%) of all observation, while the 
number of observations of no duality was (94), which formed (90.4%) of all observation. We can note that, almost, 
all bank appeared no duality, except for (Bank of Jordan) appeared duality throughout the whole period. Also, the 
means of audit committee independence for all banks for the period 2009 – 2016, was (59.5%), with standard 
deviation (15.5%) shows that the audit committee is mostly composed by independent non-executive directors. 
For Ownership Concentration, the mean values were (59.7%), with standard deviation (20.1%). The mean of 
institutional ownership for all banks for the period 2009 – 2016, was (8.37%), with standard deviation (13.26%). 
With regards to the mean of foreign ownership for all banks for the period 2009 – 2016, was (35.2%), with standard 
deviation (29.7%). 
furthermore, the bank size shows that the mean value (natural logarithm of total assets) for all banks for the 
period 2009 – 2016, was (21.4), with standard deviation (1.0).  While, shows that the mean of debt ratio for all 
banks for the period 2009 – 2016, was (85.7%), with standard deviation (2.6%). 
 
3.2. Correlation analysis 
3.2.1. Testing for unit root 
While working with time series data we need to test them for stationary. This test is processed to determine if there 
is a systematic change in either the mean or the variance in the data, if not it should be treated appropriately, to 
misleading estimates and spurious regression.  The verification of unit root is done in practice by using unit root 
tests such as Dickey-Fuller, Augmented Dickey-Fuller(Dickey & Fuller, 1979) and Phillips-Perron tests (Phillips 
& Perron, 1988). Augmented Dickey-Fuller test is employed which requires the estimation of the following 
equation 
 
The lag order  is chosen to satisfy the criteria of no autocorrelation. The null hypothesis of presence of non-
stationary behaviour is essentially the test of weather  or no.  
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Table 3: Unit Root test 
Variables ADF Prob. PP Prob. 
CR 
-5.710185* 
(-3.495677) 
0.0000 
-3.089204** 
(-2.889753) 
0.0305 
LIQ 
-6.184902* 
(-3.495021) 
0.0000 
-6.100982* 
(-3.495021) 
0.0000 
OPR 
-2.688762*** 
(-2.581890) 
0.0794 
-2.647095*** 
(-2.581890) 
0.0870 
BS 
-4.517483* 
(-3.495021) 
0.0003 
-4.686141* 
(-3.495021) 
0.0002 
BI 
-5.220080* 
(-3.495021) 
0.0000 
-5.251809* 
(-3.495021) 
0.0000 
DUAL 
-1.390667 
(-2.582041) 
0.5841 
-4.284275* 
(-3.495021) 
0.0008 
ACI 
-3.374349** 
(-2.889753) 
0.0141 
-3.504684* 
(-3.495021) 
0.0097 
OC 
-3.535327* 
(-3.495021) 
0.0089 
-3.550544* 
(-3.515047) 
0.0085 
IO 
-5.983363* 
(-3.495021) 
0.0000 
-5.961360* 
(-3.495021) 
0.0000 
FO 
-2.716004*** 
(-2.581890) 
0.0747 
-2.951841** 
(-2.889753) 
0.0430 
SIZE 
-2.822654*** 
(-2.581890) 
0.0586 
-2.965003* 
(-2.889753) 
0.0416 
DR 
-3.937684* 
(-3.495021) 
0.0026 
-3.957503* 
(-3.495021) 
0.0024 
(*) p<0.01, (**) p<0.05, (***) p<0.10 . 
The results of the stationary test of Unit Root show that the BI (CR, LIQ, BS, OC, IO and DR) are stationary 
at level, since the significant level (Prob.) corresponding to variables are less than 0.01. The variables (OPR, ACI, 
FO and SIZE) are stationary in different significant levels (0.01, 0.05 and 0.10), these results according to ADF 
test, with almost similar to PP test. Moreover, ADF test appears (DUAL) series with unit root, while this result 
rejected by PP test, which show that (DUAL) is stationary at (0.01) significant level. These results show that the 
null hypotheses of the unit root existence (non- Stationary) are rejected, which indicate that all mentioned variable 
are stationary at the level during the study period. 
3.2.2. Multicollinearity Test 
To test the existence of multicollinearity phenomena between model variables, Pearson correlation coefficients 
calculated between independent (predictor) variables, the results of testing multicollinearity between independents 
variables are explained by correlation matrices and VIF test as following:  
Table 4: Correlation matrix for predictor variables 
 BS BI DUAL ACI OC IO FO SIZE DR 
BS 1.000         
BI 
-
0.533** 
1.000    
    
DUAL -0.123 -0.039 1.000       
ACI -0.164 0.126 -0.156 1.000      
OC 
-
0.406** 
-0.017 0.124 -0.129 1.000 
    
IO 
0.105 0.142 -
0.304** 
0.146 -
0.212* 
1.000    
FO 
-
0.259** 
-0.038 0.293** -0.171 0.769** 
-0.429** 1.000   
SIZE 
0.347** -0.121 -0.136 0.359** -
0.275** 
-0.069 -0.128 1.000  
DR 0.081 0.017 0.068 0.062 -0.001 0.254** -0.085 0.116 1.000 
(**) Significant at 0.01, (*) Significant at 0.05 
The above table shows that maximum value of correlation coefficient (0.769) occurred between (OC and FO), 
this value may indicate there is no multicollinearity problem, otherwise the values were less than or equals (±0.769), 
which means there were no perfect relationship between variables. In the statistical literature the value (0.80) and 
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more considered as an indicator of multicollinearity existence(Gujarati & Porter, 2004). 
 
3.3. Regression analysis and hypothesis Results 
This part of study deals with regression results of explained variables (credit, liquidity and operating risks) and 
the explanatory variables (BS, BI, DUAL, ACI, OC, IO, FO, SIZE and DR) of the study. The results of 
regression generated from fixed and random effect models. The results were as following: 
3.3.1. The First hypothesis 
3.3.1.1. Regression analysis 
H1: There is no statistically significant impact for governance mechanisms (BS, BI, DUAL, ACI, OC, IO and 
FO) on the credit risks of the Jordanian banks. 
Table 5: Regression results for H1 
Variable Co-eff Std Error T-value P-value* 
BS 0.395 0.107 3.703 0.000 
BI -0.045 0.011 -4.084 0.000 
DUAL 2.989 0.910 3.283 0.001 
ACI -0.035 0.016 -2.237 0.028 
OC 0.017 0.016 1.042 0.300 
IO 0.034 0.013 2.596 0.011 
FO -0.010 0.013 -0.772 0.442 
SIZE -0.532 0.409 -1.301 0.197 
DR -0.529 0.095 -5.591 0.000 
Constant 53.994 9.792 5.514 0.000 
R-squared 
Adjusted R-squared 
F-statistic 
Prob*(F-statistic) 
D-W 
0.388 
0.329 
6.609 
0.000 
1.796 
*Significant at 0.05 level. 
3.3.1.2. Hypothesis Results 
Hypothesis 1 :There is an effect with a clear statistic significant between the impact of Internal Corporate 
Governance Mechanisms and Credit Risk. 
As illustrated in table has above table reports that R Square, the coefficient of determination equal to (0.388), 
which means that about (38.8%) of the variation in credit risks is explained by the model. The significance value 
of the F statistic (F=6.609) is (Prob F = 0.000) less than 0.05, which means that the effect of independent variables 
aggregated is significant. 
Moreover, the coefficients of the regression states that the (BI) has a significant effect on credit risk, where 
coefficient value equals (0.395) is significant with (t= 3.703) and (P-value =0.000) less than 0.05, (BI) has a 
significant effect, where coefficient value equals (-0.045) is significant with (t= -4.084) and (P-value =0.000). 
(DUAL) has significant effect, where coefficient value equals (2.989) is significant with (t= 3.283) and (P-value 
=0.001). Also, (ACI) has significant effect, where coefficient value equals (-0.035) is significant with (t= -2.237) 
and (P-value =0.028), (OC) has no significant effect, where coefficient value equals (0.017) is not significant with 
(t= 1.042) and (P-value =0.300). (IO) has significant effect, where coefficient value equals (0.034) is significant 
with (t= 2.596) and (P-value =0.011). Also, (FO) has no significant effect, where coefficient value equals (-0.010) 
is not significant with (t= -0.772) and (P-value =0.442). Finally, (SIZE) has not significant effect, where coefficient 
value equals (-0.532) is not significant with (t= -1.301) and (P-value =0.197), and (DR) has significant effect, 
where coefficient value equals (-0.529) is significant with (t= -5.591) and (P-value =0.000) 
Moreover, (D-W = 1.796) indicates there is no serial correlation, where Durbin-Watson value nearby (2) 
indicate there is no serial correlation between error terms. 
3.3.2. The Second hypothesis 
3.3.2.1. Regression analysis 
H2: There is no statistically significant impact for governance mechanisms (BS, BI, DUAL, ACI, OC, IO and 
FO) on the liquidity risks of the Jordanian banks.  
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Table 6: Regression results for H2 
Variable Co-eff Std Error T-value P-value* 
BS 0.327 0.223 1.463 0.147 
BI -0.033 0.010 -3.223 0.002 
DUAL -0.763 0.445 -1.715 0.090 
ACI -0.052 0.028 -1.903 0.060 
OC 0.003 0.028 0.110 0.913 
IO 0.138 0.019 7.439 0.000 
FO 0.054 0.014 3.818 0.000 
SIZE 2.881 0.352 8.173 0.000 
DR -0.028 0.099 -0.288 0.774 
Constant -51.868 12.429 -4.173 0.000 
R-squared 
Adjusted R-squared 
F-statistic 
Prob*(F-statistic) 
D-W 
0.456 
0.404 
8.767 
0.000 
1.927 
*Significant at 0.05 level. 
3.3.2.2. Hypothesis Results 
Hypothesis 2 :There is an effect with a clear statistic significant between the impact of Internal Corporate 
Governance Mechanisms and liquidity risk. 
The above table reports that R Square, the coefficient of determination equal to (0.456), which means that 
about (45.6%) of the variation in liquidity risks is explained by the model. The significance value of the F statistic 
(F= 8.767) is (Prob F = 0.000) less than 0.05, which means that the effect of independent variables aggregated is 
significant. 
Moreover, the coefficients of the regression states that the (BI) has no significant effect on liquidity risks, 
where coefficient value equals (0.327) is not significant with (t= 1.463) and (P-value =0.147) greater than 0.05, 
(BI) has a significant effect, where coefficient value equals (-0.033) is significant with (t= -3.223) and (P-value 
=0.002). (DUAL) has no significant effect, where coefficient value equals (-0.763) is not significant with (t= -
1.715) and (P-value =0.090). Also, (ACI) has no significant effect, where coefficient value equals (-0.052) is not 
significant with (t= -1.903) and (P-value =0.060), (OC) has no significant effect, where coefficient value equals 
(0.003) is not significant with (t= 0.110) and (P-value =0.913). (IO) has significant effect, where coefficient value 
equals (0.138) is significant with (t= 7.439) and (P-value =0.000). Also, (FO) has a significant effect, where 
coefficient value equals (0.054) is not significant with (t= 3.818) and (P-value =0.000). Finally, (SIZE) has a 
significant effect, where coefficient value equals (2.881) is significant with (t= 8.173) and (P-value =0.000), and 
(DR) has no significant effect, where coefficient value equals (-0.028) is not significant with (t= -0.288) and (P-
value =0.774) 
Moreover, (D-W = 1.927) indicates there is no serial correlation, where Durbin-Watson value nearby (2) 
indicate there is no serial correlation between error terms. 
3.3.3. The Their hypothesis 
3.3.3.1. Regression analysis 
H3: There is no statistically significant impact for governance mechanisms (BS, BI, DUAL, ACI, OC, IO and 
FO) on the operating risks of the Jordanian banks. 
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Table 7: Regression results for H3 
Variable Co-eff Std Error T-value P-value* 
BS -0.009 0.007 -1.384 0.170 
BI -0.002 0.001 -2.132 0.036 
DUAL -0.255 0.043 -5.973 0.000 
ACI -0.001 0.001 -1.453 0.150 
OC -0.002 0.001 -2.285 0.025 
IO 0.002 0.001 3.175 0.002 
FO 0.001 0.001 2.652 0.009 
SIZE 0.989 0.012 85.309 0.000 
DR -0.009 0.004 -2.184 0.032 
Constant -2.433 0.224 -10.852 0.000 
R-squared 
Adjusted R-squared 
F-statistic 
Prob*(F-statistic) 
D-W 
0.972 
0.969 
365.257 
0.000 
1.715 
*Significant at 0.05 level. 
3.3.3.2. Hypothesis Results 
Hypothesis 3: There is an effect with a clear statistic significant between the impact of Internal Corporate 
Governance Mechanisms and operational risk. 
The above table reports that R Square, the coefficient of determination equal to (0.972), which means that 
about (97.2%) of the variation in operating risks is explained by the model. The significance value of the F statistic 
(F= 365.257) is (Prob F = 0.000) less than 0.05, which means that the effect of independent variables aggregated 
is significant. 
Moreover, the coefficients of the regression states that the (BI) has no significant effect on operating risks, 
where coefficient value equals (-0.009) is not significant with (t= -1.384) and (P-value =0.170) greater than 0.05, 
(BI) has a significant effect, where coefficient value equals (-0.002) is significant with (t= -2.132) and (P-value 
=0.036). (DUAL) has a significant effect, where coefficient value equals (-0.255) is significant with (t= -5.973) 
and (P-value =0.000). Also, (ACI) has no significant effect, where coefficient value equals (-0.001) is not 
significant with (t= -1.453) and (P-value =0.150), (OC) has a significant effect, where coefficient value equals (-
0.002) is significant with (t= -2.285) and (P-value =0.025). (IO) has a significant effect, where coefficient value 
equals (0.002) is significant with (t= 3.175) and (P-value =0.002). Also, (FO) has a significant effect, where 
coefficient value equals (0.001) is significant with (t= 2.652) and (P-value =0.009). Finally, (SIZE) has a 
significant effect, where coefficient value equals (0.989) is significant with (t= 85.309) and (P-value =0.000), and 
(DR) has a significant effect, where coefficient value equals (-0.009) is significant with (t= -2.184) and (P-value 
=0.032) 
Moreover, (D-W = 1.715) indicates there is no serial correlation, where Durbin-Watson value nearby (2) 
indicate there is no serial correlation between error terms. 
Table 8: Summary of the research result 
Hypothesis Hypothesis statement p Results 
H1 There is an effect with a clear statistic significant between the impact of 
Internal Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Credit Risk. 
0.000 
Accept 
H2 There is an effect with a clear statistic significant between the impact of 
Internal Corporate Governance Mechanisms and liquidity risk. 
0.000 
Accept 
H3 There is an effect with a clear statistic significant between the impact of 
Internal Corporate Governance Mechanisms and operational risk. 
0.000 
Accept 
*Represent the significance at the 5% level 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
This study was conducted using data collected from annual reports of 13 Jordanian banks listed on Bursa Amman 
for the period of 2009 to 2016. This research focused on all Jordanian commercial banks. The statistical method 
used for this study was Panel data analysis. Three hypotheses were developed by the researchers based on past 
studies (refers to table 4). 
The results show that the first hypothesis which suggests that the Internal corporate governance mechanisms 
had an effect on credit risk with R Square, the coefficient of determination equal to (0.388), which means that 
about (38.8%) of the variation in credit risks, which means that the effect of independent variables aggregated is 
significant. This result is consistent with those found in prior research (Al-Smadi, 2013; Huang & Wang, 2015; 
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Hutchinson, Seamer, & Chapple, 2015) While different with (Al-Zamel, 2015; Eling & Marek, 2014). The 
hypothesis 2 also reveals that the presence of the effect of independent variables aggregated is significant. Where, 
R Square, the coefficient of determination equal to (0.456), which means that about (45.6%) of the variation in 
liquidity risks. This result is consistent with those found in prior research (Alam & Ali Shah, 2013; Eling & Marek, 
2014)While different with (Adams & Mehran, 2003; Laeven & Levine, 2009). The hypothesis 3 also reveals that 
the presence of the effect of independent variables aggregated is significant. Where, R Square, the coefficient of 
determination equal to (0.972), which means that abou (97.2%) of the variation in operating risks. This result is 
consistent with those found in prior research (Pathan, 2009)While different with (HAMDAN 2105). 
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